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For centuries western ....Titers and critics have viewed tragedy as central
to their cultural tradition. For almost as long, they ha ve wondered whether tragedy
has disappeared , and if so exac tly why it disappeared. Wagn er 's attem pt to revive
tragic drama th rough opera wa s intended as a resp onse to the purported
disappearance of tragedy as an art fonn; and Nietzsche 's you thful essa y The Birth
of Tragedy (1872) is part ly an exploration of tragedy 's death and its supposed
rebirth in Wagner 's artwork of the future, In the United States, Joseph Wood Krutch
declared the death of tragedy in his boo k The Modern Temper in 1929, arguing,
"we write no tragedies today, but we can still talk about the tragic spirit of which
we would, perhaps , have no conception were it not for the" tragedies of previous
centuries.' George Steiner's 196 1 study The Death oJ Tragedy demonstrates some
of the ways in which western writers like Wagner and critics like Nietzsche have,
over the centuries , sought to respond to tragedy's alleged disappearance. At times
Steiner 's book reads like a whodunit: Who killed tragedy? Isit really dead? Steiner
shows that there are a grea t many possible culprits. even if philological detective
work is unable to identi fy the murderer unequivocally. Of course alm ost as vocal
as those declaring the death of tragedy have been critics, such as Kenneth Burke,
who insisted in 1953 that " in the matter ofthe tragic spirit . , . there seems to beno
essential abatement at all ,"? or Thomas F. Van Laan, who argued in 1991 that "the
myth {of the death of tragedy] had no bus iness ever existing,") or William Stann.
who, in his 1998 stud y oftragic theory, insisted that there has bee n no funda mental
break in either tragic spirit or tragic drama, "which endu res in our own time, and
which will continue" fo r as long as hum an beings creative ly respo~d to the
fundamental dilemmas of life ."
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The belief that tragedy occupiesa privilegedposition in the western cultural
tradition goes back at least to Aris totle . In his Poetics, written in the fourth century
Be , the philosopher gives pride ofplace to the tragic art form, calling it superior to
the epic because it accomplishes a similar end with greater economy of means.
Aristotle believes that "that which is more concentrated gives greater pleasure
than that which is dispersed over a greater length of tirne."! In other words, the
tragic drama is superior to the epic poem because, although just as powerful. it is
shorter and hence more concent rated in its effect.
Aristotle also praises the way that tragedy combines drama and music
with story-telling; here the philosopher anticipates the arguments that Wagner was
to make over two millennia later about the superiority of the Gesamtkunstwerk.
Whereas, Aristotl e explains, the epic poem features story- telling alone, tragedy
enhances story-te lling wit h theatrica l play-acting, wh ich increases tragedy's
"viv idness," and "music, which intensifies our pleasure in the highest degree.?'
For all these reasons, Aristotle asserts, "tragedy is superior to epic poetry'?
What makes trag ic drama superior to comedy---even though the latter
also contains theatrica l and musical elements-is, for Aristotle, the fact that tragedy
takes as its subject matter a higher, more serious-minde d theme, whereas comedy
appeals to the instincts of lower peop le. All art is based on imitat ion , since human
beings ha ve a natural instinct to mimic the wor ld around them, Aristotle asserts;
but some are drawn to imitations of base actions , while othe rs are attracted to
imitations of the serious and dignified. The philosopher claims that at some point
in its his torical development "po etry spli t into two kinds; for the graver spirits
tended to imitate noble actions and noble persons performing them, and the more
frivolous poets the doings ofbaser persons." Tragedy appeals to poets with "graver
spirits," and hence-after relatively unexalted origins "in impromptus by the leaders
of the dithyramb ic chorus"-it ultimately came "to assume an air of dignity" as
the greatest of westem literary art forms." Perhaps the continuing fascinati on of
western cultural critics with the problem of tragedy derives in no small part from
the fact that Aristotle, the west 's first literary critic, devoted a large portion of his
Poetics, his first work of literary theory, to the identification and desc ription of
tragedy. The "air of dignit y" with which Aris totle credited tragedy in the fifth
century Be has rema ined with it to this day.
That "air of d ignit y" was still very much present when Steiner, asserting
that "we are entering on large, difficu lt ground," began his study oftragedy and its
purported death by stating that tragic drama-not only central but also unique to
the western trad ition-deals fundamentally with the unfairness and ungovernability
of a world without "rationa l explanation or mercy," in which "things are as they
are, unrel enting and absurd."? Here Steiner is following Nietzsche, who had also
asserted that tragedy provides an unflinching look at the real misery that lies at the
foun dation of human existence. In the same vein, Steiner assert s that trage dy
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reminds man ofhis absolute powerlessness in the face of a cruel , unrelenting fate ;
it shows, the critic believes, that no matter how far man progresses, how much he
learns, or how much'power over the world he gains , such rises serve only to increase
the depth of his inevitable fall. Steiner suggests, however, that tragedy's
demonstration of man's absolute powerlessness ultimately, and paradoxically,
ennobles him, for it is "in the very excess of his suffering" that "man's claim to
dignity" lies. "Powerless and broken, a blind beggar hounded out of the city, he
assumes a new grandeur. '?" Here too Steiner is following Nietzsche, who had
claimed that it is in bearing up to great suffering that human beings restore dignity
and meaning to their lives. Krutch had also insisted that "it is only in calamity that
the human spirit has the opportunity to reveal itself triumphant over the outward
universe." I I Van Laan refers to those who espouse this line of thinking as
"affirmationists."1 2
It is this vision ofhuman grandeur in the face ofeven the worst adversity
that is lost with tragedy, and hence the urgency with which Steiner, like Nietzsche,
seeks to identify the possible causes for tragedy's disappearance. That
disappearance, for Steiner and others, is more than just an academic question of
interest only to literary scholars. As Wagner had declared in 1849, "the downfall
of Tragedy" marched "hand-in-hand with the dissolution of the Athenian State.?"
'Wagner, like many others, believed that the disappearance of tragedy is a primary
sign of cultural decadence which correlates with and perhap~ ultimately leads to
the dissolution of an entire state or civilization. Likewise for Nietzsche, tragedy
was the key to "the innermost life ground of a people," giving them strength of
community feeling andpatriotism," Krutch saw the death oftragedy as congruent
with a general decline in man's ability to believe in his own greatness. "Distrusting
its thought, despising its passions, realizing its impotent unimportance in the
universe," Krutch insisted, modem society "can tell itself no stories except those
which make it still more acutely aware of its trivial miseries.'?" For Steiner and
Krutch, no less than for Nietzsche, the death oftragedy opens up profound insights
into western culture's path away from myth and religious belief and hence also
away from tragedy as what Steiner calls "that form of art which requires the
intolerable burden ofGod's presence.' :" Given its centrality to the western cultural
tradition, tragedy comes to represent western civilization itself- hence the death of
tragedy implies the death ofGod and the decline ofwestern culture more generally,
just as its birth implies mythic renewal and cultural revival. As Susan Sontag
argued in the 1960s, "modem discussions of the possibility of tragedy are not
exercises in literary analysis; they are exercises in cultural diagnostics, more or
less disguised." Moreover, the critic asserted, "the burial of a literary form is a
moral act, a high achievement of the modern morality of honesty."!?
In spite ofthe problem's recognized importance, there has been no attempt
to link Freud's brief psychoanalytic account of the birth of tragedy in Totem and
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Taboo (1913) with the aesthetic and cultural accounts given by Nietzsche, Wagner,
Krutch , Steiner, and others. Indeed, Stanley Edgar Hyman's 1956 judgment that
critics have done little to establish a connection between psychoanalysis and tragedy
is still surprisingly valid almost halfa century later.18 This has left a curious gap in
accounts of the birth and death of tragedy, as if psychoanalysis, anthropology,
sociology, and literary history and theory had little to say to each other on this
important subject.
In what follows I would like to suggest an approach toward filling that
gap. I am far from wanting to impose a strict Freudian interpretation of tragic
drama and its development; however, I do want to suggest that the problem of
tragedy and its history offer an ideal opportunity for mutual collaboration among
the interpretive social sciences and the humanities. Freud offers a vital entry into
such collaboration precisely because of his insistence on the importance of
interpretation. The problem of tragedy is not accessible to quantitative or
experimental method; however, it presents fruitful ground for the kind ofinterpretive
synthesis at which Freud himselfexcelled. Although one may judge Freud to have
failed on any number of counts, such failures should not induce one to remain
silent about the larger questions Freud asked. Indeed, it is frequently more
interesting to fail at answering a very important question than to succeed in
answering a trivial one.
Although Steiner and several other analysts ofthe death of tragedy wrote
at a time when many literary critics were strongly influenced by Freudian
interpretations of literature, none of them sought to use Freud's work to help
illuminate the problem of the death of tragedy. This is all the more remarkable
since Freud himselfwas fascinated with tragedy and used the eponymous hero of
Sophocles's most famous drama to designate the "Oedipus complex." Moreover,
Freud explicitly connected the origin of tragedy to the birth of culture itself,
suggesting that the history oftragedy is an"important indicator ofthe way in which
"the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus
complex.?" For Steiner, however, as for Nietzsche, tragedy was incompatible
with the optimistic dictates of western rationalism, of which Freud himself was
very much a product and primary representative. If, Nietzsche argues, tragedy
expressed a brave and honest pessimism, then the "death of tragedy" lay in the
"basic forms of' Socratic optimism." "Optimistic dialectic," Nietzsche insists,
"destroys the essence oftragedy," for, far from holding that the core ofhuman life
is unfathomable suffering, it believes that all mysteries are susceptible to rational
explanation." Socrates, the prototype of the "theoretical optimist" for Nietzsche,
has unlimited "faith that the nature ofthings can be fathomed," and he "ascribes to
knowledge and insight the power ofa panacea.?" For Steiner any form ofoptimism,
whether based on rationalism or on religion, fundamentally contradicts the essential
pessimism oftragedy. Hence, for Steiner, Freud's rationalist use ofGreek tragedy
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was simply one further proof of the inhospitality of the modem logical world to
the mythicsensibi lity oftragic drama. As Hyman....-rites, " insofar as psychoanalysis
is a branch ofclinical psychology aimed at therapy, it i ~ optimistic and meliorative,"
unlike rragedy.2J However, whereas Hyman makes a distinction between Freud's
more optimistic clinical work and his "gloomy, stoic, and essentially trag ic"
philosophy of life," Steiner believes that the "great Jewish poet Freud" took the
radically inexplicable irrationalism of tragedy and transformed it into something
completely different: a dear, logica l explanation of the human psyche." Hence,
Freud serves merely as a guidepost, not as a guide, in Steiner 's account of the
death of tragedy.
Although Freud' s interpretation of the Oedipus complex as a phenomenon
in the individual psyche and as the primary element in all neuroses may once have
offered-and may still offer-a useful framework for analyzing specific literary
works, from Shakespeare's Hamlet through Wagner 's Siegfried to Miller's Death
ofa Salesman, that interpretation is not in and of itself helpful for those trying to
understand either the nature or the disappearance of tragedy as an art form more
generally. Hence, it is understandab le that Steiner and others tended to ignore
Freud's work on the individual psyche in their studies. However, Freud's broader,
more speculative work on the devetopmem of human culture itse lf is potentially
more valuable, since it poses precisely the kind of large questions about the general
development of culture that are also at stake in the problem of the death of tragedy.
Freud himself, in Totem and Taboo , expressed surprise at discovering "t hat the
problems of social psychology," like those of individual psychology, "should prove
soluble on the basis of one single concrete point-man's relation to his father."!'>
It was precisely on that single point, however, that his 'own account of social
psychology converged. As Freud declared over a decade and a half later in
Civilization and its Discon tents (1930), "the process of human civilization and the
developmental or educative process of individual human beings ... are vel)' similar
in nature, if not the same process applied to different kinds of objec t."?" Why
Freud's ambitious attempts to link psychology with anthropology and sociology in
a generalized theory of human cultu ral history were generally ignored by Steiner
and others-including Hyman- in their exploration of the problem of tragedy is
an intriguing question. One possible answer may lie precisely in the ambitiousness
of Freud's attempt to connect the individual with social psychology, thus making
the Oedipus complex the key to unders tanding the history of not j ust the human
individual, but also the human species. As Freud acknowledged. the history of
civilization itselfis a far more difficult abstraction than that of the individual human
being, "and it is therefore harder to apprehend in concrete terms.?" Another
answer may lie in Hyman 's critique of the relentless optimism ofAmerican culture,
which he believes has affected even the interpretation ofFreud himself, threatening
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to tum psychoanalysis into just another form of self-help and amelioration in the
manner of Norman Vincent Peale."
Freud's intent to shed light on the development of civilization itself by
means of a monocausal explanation may have struck scholars in the second halfof
the twentieth century as impertinent or excessive. As the reception of Freud for
the last century, up to the present moment, clearly shows, even Freud's attempt to
provide an interpretive framework for understanding the development of the
individual human psyche remains profoundly controversial; it is all. the more
audacious to,make that monocausal framework one part ofan even more grandiose
picture, in which nothing less than a general explanation of human history is at
stake. Freud's work on the development ofhuman culture was very much a part of
such a grandiose, historical picture. It was informed by the great sociological and
anthropological proj ects of the turn of the twentieth century and undertaken at a
time when European social scientists believed that by studying the customs and
rituals of the most primitive peoples at the greatest remove from Europe-> .
particularly the Australian aborigines, who appeared to anthropologists as a
relatively pristine original people, untouched by the development of European
civilization-they could study the fundamental structures and forces at work in
the early development ofall cultures, including that ofEurope itself. Freud's project,
in other words , was part ofa generalized scientific optimism, which held that human
cultures .develop along a relatively clear path from the primitive to the more
advanced, a path that , moreover, could be studied and understood.
The word primitive has, since the middle ofthe twentieth century, acquired
a problematic colonialist tone; that problematization is itself probably a clue as to
why, during the period' following the end of World War Two, the social science
projects of the beginning of the twentieth century were not considered applicable
to the question of tragedy and its disappearance. After all , the war and the mass
murders of civilians that marked its nadir fundamentally shook Europeans' belief
in themselves as somehow more advanced than or superior to 'cultural primitives.
The crimes committed in Europe in the first half of the 1940s were, as Freud's
erstwhile colleague Carl Gustav lung declared in 1945 from his neutral homeland
Switzerland, "a blow aimed at all Europeans," who had, lung asserted, previously
been able to relegate such atrocities to the supposedly more primitive peoples of a
mythic Asia." As lung's fellow countryman, the playwright Max Frisch, put it
four years later, these crimes had been committed not by "a people from whom we
expect the worst, because they don't have running water and can't read; but by a
nation which possesses and creates at a high level what we have, until now,
understood as Kultur'?' In fact, those crimes had to a large extent been committed ,
by people raised in the same cultural tradition and speaking the same language as
Freud, lung , and Frisch.
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Twentieth-century European history fundamental ly shoo k the faith of
European el ites in the supe riority of the ir own c ulture . Ste iner. who was
subsequently 10 devote part of his book Language and Silence to an explo ration of
the ways in which postwar cultu re responded to the Holoca ust." duly noted the
impact of twentieth-century history on contemporary culture and its apparent
inability to produce tragedy as an art form; however. the very cultural break that
Steiner invoked may. sim ultaneou sly. ha ve prevented him from seeking an
explanation for the death oftragcdy-one of the centra l signs ofthai break- in the
rationalis t projects cha racteristic of th e pre-Holoc aust worl d. "The political
inhumanity .of our time ... has demeaned and bruta lized language beyond any
precedent." Steiner argues in The Dearh of Tragedy.)} Hence he believes that
arti stic language is increasingly inca pab le of addr essing hi stor ica l reality .
"Language seems to choke on the facts," he writes." In this radically new situation,
the faith in reason invoked prior to World War Two probably seemed fundamentally
misplaced.
For the social scie ntists of the tum of the twe ntieth century, the contrast
between non-European pr imit iv ism and Europea n cultural ad vancem ent was
fundamental to their project . Emile Durkheim . whose 1912 study of religious life
among the Austra lian aborigines in formed Freud 's own work on Totem and Taboo
a year later, defined the prim itive succinctly when hewrote that a society is primitive
if and when its "organization is surpassed by no others in simplicity.':" Thus the
primitive and the simple correspond to each other in Durkheim's view; and the
simple must be sought in faraway places. Much as astrophysicists now, at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, are seeking to understand the orig ins of the
universe by focus ing their telescopes on the furthest regions of the sky-regions
so remote that their light now reaching the earth was emitted billions of light years
ago , to ward the beginning of the un iverse- so Eu ropea n a nd A me rican
anthropologists at the begi nning of'the twentieth century sought to understand the
development of their own cu lture by studying its presumptive past in the observable
present of remote, prim itive peoples. As Durkheim declared in justification of his
study of religion among the Austral ian abo rigines, these primitive tribes provided
him with a clear picture of religion in its most basic, fundamental forms. uncorrupted
by the subsequent complexities introduced. especially. in the advanced culture of
Europe. In keeping with his defin ition of the primitive. Durkhe im believes that
"primitive civilizations offer privileged cases . . . becau se they are simple cases."
in which "el l is reduced to that which is ind ispensable," i.e .. "that which is essential,
that is to say, that which we must know before all else ."?" Just as the physicist. "in
order to discover the laws of the phenomena which he stud ies. . . . tries to simplify
these latter and rid them of the ir secondary characteristics." so too the sociologist.
in seeking to understand com plex soci al institutions like religion. studies prim itive
30 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
societies, because "nature spontaneously makes the same sort of simplifications at
the beginning of history. '?" Freud makes essentially the same claim about the
usefulness ofprimitive cultures for all attempts to understand more advanced ones
.when, at the beginning of Totem and Taboo, he asserts that the mental life of"those
whom we describe as savages or half-savages " .. must have a peculiar interest for
us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our
own development."38
In Totem and Taboo, Freud directly addresses the question of the birth of
tragedy, but not that of its death. In his interpretation, the Greek origins of tragedy
represent a moment in western culture not far removed from the primitive, totemic
framework ofthe Australian aborigines. Drawing on the work of Salomon Reinach,
the great French scholar of religious history, Freud suggests that the goat-song
with which tragedy first began-and which is inscribed in the word itself-was
none other than the formalized remnant ofan archaic totemic ritual. For Reinach,
Greek drama had arisen from Dionysian religious rites, which had originally "circled
around the sacrifice of a totemic goat , otherwise Dionysos himself; his death was
bewailed, and then his resurrection was celebrated with transports of joy. The
lamentations gave birth to tragedy, the rejoicings to comedy.'?" Reinach's
interpretation does not conflict with Aristotle or Nietzsche or many later accounts
of the birth of tragedy. Nietzsche asserts that tragedy arose out of the religious
rituals of the Dionysian cult, while Aristotle sees its origins in "the dithyrambic
chorus." As Storm points out, not only are the Dionysian and the dithyrambic
frequently equated in the tragic tradition, but there is still widespread agreement in
tragic scholarship that tragedy emerged out of Dionysian cultic rituals."
'Freud elaborates on Reinach's account by suggesting that the origins of
tragedy lay In the primal totemic meal, in which the father of the primal horde is
murdered and devoured by his sons. Tragedy, he writes, is one ofthe many cultural
practices which emerge out ofthat original event. For Freud, the hero ofthe tragic
drama "had to suffer because he was the primal father, the Hero of the great
primaeval tragedy which was being re-enacted with a tendentious twist. " 41 The
"twist" lay in the fact that the chorus mourning the death of the tragic hero in the
drama represented the very sons who, in remote reality, had murdered their father
in the first place. Tragedy hence represents for Freud a"systematic distortion" and
is "the product ofa refined hypocrisy."? It is an organized, ritualized instantiation
of chutzpah: murdering one's parent and then bewailing the fact that one has been
cruelly orphaned. It is also an exercise in blaming the victim. In the ritual of
tragedy, the chorus projects onto the tragic hero its own crime-rebellion against
paternal authority-thus vindicating itself and justifying the hero's tragic fall.
Simultaneously, the chorus mourns the hero's downfall and identifies itself with
him, thus paradoxically acknowledging his ongoing and renewed authority.
Fall 2002 31
For Freud, then, tragedy represents at the level of civili zation and its
development the same phe nomenon that the Oed ipus com plex represents at the
level ofthe individual and his psychologica l development: an early response to the
primal cnme. which is the murder of the father. However, whereas tragedy itself
as a cultural phenomenon is still close to the primal crime, the Oedipus complex as
a phenomenon ofindividual psychological development repeats itselfsymbolically
ineach generation, up to the present. Although it initially emerged from the literal
murder ofthe father, the Oedipus com plex subsequently revolved around themere
desire to murder the father. Whereas western c ivilization itsel f has grown old,
individual members of that civ iliza tion co ntinue to be born and to develop from
infancy to adulthood. Hence tragedy may have been a cultura l phenomenon that
occurred during the youth of wes tern civi lization and now no longer occurs, but
the Oedipus complex as part ofeach person 's psychological development continues
to occur.
Freud had attempted in Totem and Taboo to connect Reinach 's explanation
of the orig in of trage dy with his own theory of the Oedipus co mplex as the prime
mover in the evolution ofhuman civilization , and he had undergirded that connection ,
withthe findings of anthropo logists and socio logists on totemic cultures inAustraJia
and the Americas, from Reinach and Durkhe im in France to James G. Frazer and
Robertson Smith in Britain. Tragedy represented for Freud a rela tively ear ly stage
in the development ofwestem civilization, a moment sufficiently close to its origins
that it could be fruitfu lly co mpared with the contemporary primitive cultures of
non-European regio ns like Australia and the Americas.
When he returned to broader anthropological and sociological questions
in Civilization and its Discontents at the end ofthe 1920s, Freud was significantly
more pessimistic about the disti nction betwe en the primitive and the adva nced in
hwnan culture . World War One and its horrors separated the two studies from
each other; and the year in which Civilization and its Discontents was published
marked not only the begi nning of the world economic cris is known in the United
States as the Great Depression, but also a moment of po litical turmoil in Austria
and Germany, as Central Europe began its descent into Nazism and further war. In
other words, Freud had good reasons to be more pessimistic in the latter book than
in the fonn er. The central question ofCivilization and its Discontents- wh y modern
human beings are unhappy in the civiliza tion they have created- shows that the
clear contrast between European civilization and non-European barbarism, while
still intact, has lost all traces of smug Europea n self-satisfaction. Freu d wonders
why there is so widespread a bel ief througho ut Europe "th at what we call our
civilization is largely respons ible for our misery, and that we should bemu ch happier
if we gave it up and return ed to primitive conditions.....J
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Whi le Freud doe s not return to the problem of trag edy in this study, his
conclusions on advanced European civilization sugges t a possible route for
explaining the death of tragedy,just ashis earlier conclusions on primitive European
civilizat ion had explicitly laid out a theory of tragedy's birth. Indeed, the absence
of tragedy from Civilization and its Discontents wou ld seem to correspond to its
absence as an art Conn from advanced civ ilized life, just as its presence in Totem
and Taboo had suggested its fundamental presence in earlier civilized life. Hence,
the presence or absence of remnants of totemic culture, such as traged y, would
seem, for Freud, to be a function of the relative distance of a society from its
origi ns : the more primitive a society, the more obvious will be the remnants of
totemism, while the more advanced the society is, the more it will be difficult to
find such remnants. Sinc e Freud expli citly drew on his work from Totem and
Taboo in his elaborations in Civilization and its Discontents, there is no reason to'
suppose that his views on the origin of tragedy had changed in the intervening
years .
Freud 's fundamental conclusion in Civilization and its Discontents about
unhappiness in civil izat ion is that the path from primitive cultures to advanced
cultures is one from a state in which the individual is relatively guilt-free to one in
wh ich the burden of guilt becomes increasingly intolerable. It was his intention,
Freud wrote, "to represe nt the sense of guilt as the mos t important problem in the
development of civilization, and to show that the price we pay for our advance in
civ ilizat ion is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt.':"
Guilt, Freud believes, is nothing more than introjected aggression , i.e., aggression
that, instead of be ing directed at other persons, is direct ed within , against the
individual himself. For- civilization to succeed at all as an organized community of
multiple ind ividuals, such introjection of aggression is necessary, and without it
community would be impossible. Just as the individual child gradually learns to
control his aggressions by deve loping a superego, part of who se function it is to
serve as his conscie nce, so too society itself slowly moves from a more primitive
stale of naked individual aggression to a state in which indi vidual aggression is
controlled in the first instance by phys ical coercion and, in the second instance,
and even more impo rtantly, by the development o f cultural institut ions such as
religion, education, and art that function as a kind of collecti ve supe rego, and that
offer individuals product ive outlets for releas ing, as we ll as means of controllin g,
their pent-up energies . In the individual child the deve lopment ofthe superego is
also the result of a process of introject ion , through. which the absol ute external
physical power of the father and his repre sentat ives or surroga tes comes to be
replaced by an interna l but even more powerfu l substitute which serv es three
functions: ego-ideal, observer, and punisher. The ego-ideal repres ent s what the
child would like to be; the obse rver is the instance that keeps him under surveillance;
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and the punisher acts when surveillance shows that the child has done something
wTOng. Through the process ofintrojection all of these functions , previously located
in the liv ing father himsel f or his surro gates or representatives. become a
fundamental part of the ch ild 's psyche. In the history of civilization, the prima l
father is similarly replaced ; after his murder and quite litera l ingestion by his sons ,
he becomes the totem animal ofprimitive religions and , ultimately, the omnipotent
father of monotheistic reli gions. As Freud suggested in both Totem and Taboo and
in Civilization and its Disconten ts. as well as in Moses and Monotheism (1939).
even the advanced monotheistic religions of the wes t. Juda ism and Chri stianity,
cannot hide the original rebell ion aga inst the primal father in which they have the ir
roots. Indeed , he writes in Totem and Taboo . "we can trace through the ages the
identity ofthe totem meal with animal sacrifice, with the anthropic human sacrifice,
and with the Christian Euchari st.':"
Combining Freud 's discussion of the origin of Attic tragedy in Totem and
Taboo with his account of civilizational development as leading ultimately to a
hype~rophy of guilt as introjected aggression in Civilization and its Discontents ,
it is possible to identify the emergence oftragedy in western civilization as occurring
at a mome nt when aggression has not yet been introjected. i.e., in which it is sti ll.
for the most part, directed externa lly rather than interna lly. In other wo rds. traged y
emerges at a moment when the guilty conscience of the individual is not at all or
only partially deve loped. The process of cultural refinement that ultimatel y leads
to a decrease in social violence has not completely succeeded. and the social world
is still full ofnaked, brutal aggression. The violent individual in Aeschylean tragedy
does not feel any approximation of what one migh t call. with respect to a character
ina modern drama, guilt. Punishment for crimes in Aeschylean tragedy-the earliest
tragedies known to usc-comes directly or indirectl y from the gods and direct ly
from those whom the tragic hero has wronged." Agamemnon is killed by his wife
Clytemnestra; Clytemnestra is killed by her son Orestes; and Orestes is pursued
and tormented by the Eum enides, who seek to punish him for his murder of his
mother. Not one member of this human family-father. mother. or son-is troubled
by feelings of guilt. In the world of Aeschylean tragedy, it is not the role of the
individual human being to guarantee moral o rder. Instead, the mora l authority of
the universe is guaranteed by the gods themse lves , whose pow er is unquestioned.
As the chorus in Agamemnon declares, the course of events is und'erwritten by
Zeus, "first cause, prim e mover.lFor what thing without Ze us is done among
mortals?/What here is without God's bless ing?' ''? Ifal l things come about through
the will of the gods , then so too vengeance belongs to them:
The gods fail not to mark
those who have killed many.
The black Furies stalking the man
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fortunate beyond all right
wrench back again the set of his life
and drop him to darkness ."
Murder is a crime, and it is punished by the gods. Likewise, no man has
the right to excessive fortune , and those men "fortunate beyond all right" will be
punished. The implication is that excessive fortune is almost certainly a sign that
those who enjoy it are criminals and that , in and of itself, it constitutes a crime
against the gods, exciting their envy. Hence , the chorus implores: "Let me attain
no envied wealth,/let me not plunder cities."49
The invocation of the gods as entities who can prevent such misfortune is
more than just a grammatical construction. Describing what she calls the original
tragic audiences' "surreal" or "super-real" world, Ruth Padel writes that the universe
ofAttic drama is "crackling with temperalnental, potentially malevolent, divinity,"
gods "permeating and disturbing all things, acting through the world's solid fabric."50
The furies of vengeance are no mere figments of the imagination, as modern
rationalism would interpret them to be; they are real forces with physical
consequences in the world. After he has murdered his mother, Orestes is tormented
by women who "come like gorgons," wearing "robes ofblack" and "wreathed in a
tangle of snakes.' ?' When the chorus-perhaps anticipating the arguments of
contemporary rationalism-assures Orestes that what he is seeing is a figment of
his imagination, he replies , "These are no fancies ofaffliction. They are clear,/and
real, and here; the bloodhounds ofmy mother's hate." 52 And Orestes is absolutely
right that he is being pursued by the Furies; it is they who follow him to Athens,
where he is put on trial. In The Eumenides, it is the gods themselves who take
center stage in the drama, relegating Orestes to insignificance. As Cassandra had
predicted shortly before her own and Agamemnon's murder, "We two/must die,
yet die not vengeless by the gods." Orestes , Agamemnon's son, would come as a
tool of divine vengeance, she foretold: "For this is a strong oath and sworn by the
high gods,/that he shall cast men headlong for his father felled. "53 And Athene
tells the angry furies at the end of the Oresteia that Orestes, far from wronging the
gods by visiting vengeance upon his mother, has done nothing but carry out their
will; Apollo, "who spoke the oracle was he/who ordered Orestes so to act and not
be hurt."?" Even Orestes himself acknowledges that he committed his crime "by
order of this god, here.?" In Aeschylean drama there is no inner world of a
character that is at odds with an outer world; rather, the outer world determines
and to some extent even creates whatever interiority there is. As Ruth Padel
succinctly argues, "We think of emotion COIning from inside. Greek does not."56
What is most striking about the Oresteia from the point ofview ofmodern
drama is the complete absence ofpsychology. The unimportance ofpsychology is
neither coincidental nor a flaw, as it would be in an age in which character
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development is believed to occupy the center of dram atic art. Aristotle had defined
action itself as the primary element in tragic drama and declared character to be
secondary. "What happens-that is, the plot-is the end for which a tragedy exists,"
he had declared. "What is more , without action there could not be a tragedy, but
there could be without charac terization.':" In Attic, and particularly Aeschylea n,
tragedy, it is not so much the characters themselves as what they do that is central
to thedrama. Viewers ofthe Oresteia have no clear impression of who Agamemnon,
Clytemnestra, and Orestes are or of how they came to be the way they are. We
know little about their child hood s. day-to-day activit ies, hobbies , or sex ual
proclivities. We do not know how Agamemnon and Clytemnestra treated Orestes
as a child. All such detail s would seem to be unimpo rtant and. hence. we can do
without them. These characters are, in effect, the sum of their action s. and all of
their actions have significance.
This means that there are no actions in the drama that do not signify.
Steiner notes that Greek tragedy is devoid of the detailed attention to everyday
habits so characteristic not only ofcomedy but also of much serious modem drama:
"There are no lavatories in tragic palaces. but from its very dawn. comedy has had
use for chamber pots. In tragedy. we do not observe men eating, nor do we hear
them snore.?" By way of contrast. the second act of Miller 's Death of aSalesman
begins precisely with a breakfast scene: "Wonderful coffee. Meal in itself." Biff
says to his mother. to which she replies : "Can I make you some eggs?" Although
he does not talk about snoring, Biff does discuss how soundly he has slept: "like a
deadone.':" Such banal actions and discussions about them are part ofthe realistic
quotidian world of many contemporary plays. but have no place in Att ic tragic
drama. particularly in the tragedies of Aeschylus. In Aeschylean tragedy. it is
action which carries significance; in comedy. and in many modem dramas, as Krutch
has poin ted out. actions frequently declare their insigni ficance. and thus the
insignificance of the people who carry them out. As Biff says to his moro se father
Willy shortly before the latter's suicide. "Pop! I'm a dime a dozen , and so are
you!'>60
If Aesc hylean tragedy is fund amentally abou t action and not about
character, then it is not about the individual's own growing sense of his own guilt.
and it is not about the ways in which an individual vis its punishment upon himse lf
for that guilt. Sophocles's King Oedipus. who blinds himse lf upon learning that
hehas killed his father and slept with his mother. has. by punishing him self. already
taken a step away from Aeschylean tragedy and toward modem drama and character
formation: however. in keeping with the general tendency of Attic tragedy. he is
also acting primarily as a surrogate for divine retribution. Oedipus' s act of self-
mutilation, along with the natu re of his crime. makes him the ideal temp late for
Freudian psychoanalysis. However, in their original Attic context Oedipus 's actions
were not meant to be symbolic; they were seen as all too real.
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No doubt one of the reasons Steiner is unable to integrate Shakespeare's
Hamlet into his theory of'the tragic is that its hero, although a distant relative ofthe
Greek Ore stes as an avenger ofhis father, is also a precursor ofthe modem western
individual. He is a fully-depicted. sonorous character who se personali ty, famously,
tends toward indecisiveness , sel f-reflection, and lack ofaction: a character, in short ,
who would have been impossible in Aeschylean tragedy, but who is already en
route to the world in which Arthur Miller ' s characters live, a world in which the
final verdict on the deceased protagonist, spoken by his son, is: "He never knew
who he was.'> ' Aeschylus' s figu res seek no such knowledge, and even when
Cassandra wishes to give it to them , they refuse to listen . Self-knowledge is inimical
to the action that they desire. As Nietzsche 'Wrote of Hamlet, "knowledge kills
action ; action requires the veils of illusion." However, Nietzsche is wrong in
thinking that self-knowledge connects Hamlet to the tragic hero of Aeschylean
drama; it is precisely this self-knowledge that separates him from them , for Orestes
and his fami ly neither have nor seek such self-knowledge. It is post-Attic drama
that, as Storm writes, "turned increasingly to the complex constitution ofthe human
SOUL"~2
Modem theater, in other words, tends to be self-reflexive and self-
conscious, whereas Aeschylean drama did not. In his influen tial study Metatheatre:
A New View ofDramatic Form (1963), which concurs in the j udgment that tragedy
is dead, but which suggests that tragedy' s demi se offe rs tremendous theatrical
opportunities. Lione l Abel also refused Hamlet admission into the pantheon of
trag ic heroes, calling him instead a "towering figure of' self-referential, self-
refl exive "Western me tatheatre"-modernity' s creative response to unself-
conscious, unp sychological tragedy. In Abel's view, the modern " Western
playwright ," unlike his Attic precursor, "is unable to believe in the reality of a
character who is lack ing in selt-co nsciousness.'>' Modem drama's search for
sel f-knowledge implies a disjunction between interiority and exteriority that did
not exist in the Atti c world. In Att ic drama, there was no need to explore the
mysterie s of the human soul, because any secrets were immediatel y apparent in
the charact er 's own actions and in the outside world itself. Freud cites Hamlet's
famous line that "conscience does make cowards of us all " as an indication of the
way in which civilization tends to coincide with an increase in individual feelings
ofguilt.t>4 However, Shakespeare was probabl y no t using the word conscience in
the same way that Freud intended it: for Shak espea re, it probably meant simply
knowledge or the effort to gain it. For Shakespeare, it is ratiocination itself that
makes us cowards; but the characters in Aeschylean drama have no desire to be
cowardly, and hence they seek neither rat iocination nor a Freud ian conscience .
Although Ste iner rarely draws explici tly on Nietzsc he in his account of
the development of tragedy, his title The Death ofTragedy suggests that h is own
boo k is intended as a kind of response to Nietzsche 's Birth of Tragedy ; and it is
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highly unlikely that the well-read Freud , who was clearly interested in the origins
of tragic drama in Greece. would have been unfamiliar with Nietzsche's essay,"
Over half of Nietzsche's essay is devoted not to the birth, but to the death. of
tragedy, which. he, like Steiner later on. attributes in large measure to the growth
of rationalism in Greek culture and the attendant death of the gods. In the course
of his account of the difference between traditional and modem art. Nietzsche
suggests that the fundamental distinct ion between the two lies in the measure of
belief invested by artists in the figures they create. Whereas traditional aesthetic
practice tended to endow the visions of an with what Steiner would la ter call real
presence. contemporary rationalism tends to view an as merely allegorical. " For a
genuine poet," Nietzsche writes, "metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a vicarious
image that he actually beholds in place of a concept.v- In other words, poetic
vision is a kind of madness, or, to use Krutch's term, a ''t ragic fallacy" that is
highly productive: the more the poet sees in his images actual realities, the better
he will be as a poet; whereas, the more he sees them as stand-ins or substitutes for
something else. the less poetic he is. For Nietzsche, the world ofGreek tragedy is
precisely a poetic world in which the process of psycholog ical individuation that
accompanies civilization is reversed; "the dithyrambic chorus" of the tragic drama
consists "of transformed characters whose civic past and social status have been
totally forgonen.?" Indeed. for Nietzsche. this "magic transformation is the
presupposition of all dramati c an.' '61
The arguments put together so far suggest that western civilization at the
birth of tragedy is characterized by the following fundamental elements: I . the
belief in the constant active presence and intervention of divine po....-ers: 2. an
emphasis on action rather tha n character; 3. an accompanying absence of
psychological characterization generally, and specifically of signs ofan individual
conscience or-consciousness of guilt, which presupposesAbet 's self-consciousness.
Finally, we can add a fourth stipulation: no maner how radically the heroes of
tragedy may challenge social consensus, tragic drama in its Anic form shows a
unity between the individual world and the social world. This last point is worth
further emphasizing, for it helps 10explain why the heroes of tragic drama must be
kings. queens. and princes, i.e.• the rulers of society. 11 is not so much that "the
higher they rise, the further they fall," i.e., that tragic drama requires a fall from
great heights-what in German is called Falthahe-to increase its dramatic effect.
Rather, the really crucial point is that tragic drama. like rel igion in Durkheim's
account, is an instantiation of society itself, and specifically ofa form ofsociety it:
which the individual does not yet differentiate himself from the social whole. The
king and the queen are the most powerful emblems of this identity between
individual and society: their fate is precisely not the trivial fate of the modem.
disengaged individual. who. even if he is a President or Prime Minister, is still
differentiated from the social whole in both literature and life. Rather, it is the fate
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of the entire socia l coll ective. Indeed, the Aeschy lean SIOl)' of Orestes and his
judgment is simultaneously the accountof'the foundation of theAthenian collective
and of Athenian justice.
In contrast, the world of most modem drama is a world in which tragedy
could not have been born and cannot be sustained. First and foremost, it is, as
Steinersuggests, characterized fundamentally notby the presencebut by the absence
of God. Steiner was not the first to sugges t this. Nietzsche had already insisted
that the procla mation of the death of Pan is analogous to the proclamation that
"Tragedy is dead! " and that "Poetry itself has perished with herl?" When Steiner
noted in 1961 that "our words seem tired and shopworn" and that "where the modern
scho lar cites from a class ic text , the quotatio n seems to burn a hole in his own drab
page," Nietzsche had already declared nine ty years earli er: "Away with you, pale,
meager epigones!Away to Hades, that you may for once eat your fill ofthe crumbs
of our former masters!'?' And Krutch had voiced similarly disparaging remarks
about modem drama. For both Steiner and Nietzsche before him, the reason for
the purported lack of linguistic and aesthetic force in contemporary an and language
is none other than the disappearance of God , as a result of which man is banished
to a world without mythology. In this god less world, man is no longer the tool of
divine forces, as he is in Aeschy lean tragedy. Rather, he is now a character in and
of his own right ; he has acquired unprecedented freedom, but with tha t freedom
comes a horri fic resp ons ibility. As Abel clearly shows, one need not accep t the
disparagement of modem drama as inadequate in order to share the underlying
conclusion that modem and ancient drama are indeed diffe rent.
What is tha t pro cess of character formation or of ind ividuat ion that
N ietzsche decr ies, and that he sees as having been overcome in Greek tragedy? It
is precisely in helping to shed light on this questio n tha t Freud can be of service.
Whe reas Nietzsche had suggested that the gods simply die, Freud suggests that,
far from dying , they leave their former residence in the wor ld outside the indiv idual
psyche and take up residence within , where, as the ind ividual's supe rego, they
carry out their task of surveillance, punishment , and serving as an ego- ideal. They
become the individual's conscience , which is simp ly the jud icial aspect of the self-
consciousness that Abel identifies as distinguishing modem from ancient theater.
If the Oresteia had ended with the tria l of Ores tes by the gods, modem drama
tends to feature the trial of the contem porary ind ividual by his own conscience.
However, if the Greek gods, although powerful and stem, had ultimately declared
Orestes innocent of all crimes, the modem conscience is relentless in its pursuit
and punishment of the wayward individual. It tracks him dow n and all too frequently
kills him . Once the furies of vengeance have taken up their res idence inside the
individual psyche, they exercise a regimen that is even sterner and more fearsome
than the rule of the gods previou sly. Orestes goes free and ultimately becomes a
king in his own country. Rut Willy Loman , who certainly longs to be a prince, and
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whose crimes are surely far less severe than those of Orestes. exercises the most
brutal judgment upon himself when he commits suicide.
It follows from this that suicide. so much a presence in modern drama. is,
as Storm has suggested, fundamentally not part ofthe world ofAescbylean tragedy
and "more characteristic of the contemporary era.'?' If suicide represents the
individual 's accession to three primary judicial roles-judge. executioner. and
executed criminal-s-that had previously been located beyond the purview of any
one individual, then it, too, is part of the general process of introjection which
Freud believes to lie at the root ofcultura l progress. If so much of modem drama
revolves around suicide or the possibility of suicide, whereas ancient tragedy did
not. then perhaps this change reflects a world in which. as Freud suggests,
individuation and the attendant consciousness of guilt have become virtually
intolerable and in whic h, as Emile Durkheim suggests with reference to what he
calls"egoistic" and "anomie" suicide, the human individual no longer finds himself
in union with the social networks that had previously integrated him into a
community. For Durkheim, paradoxically. to free man "from all socia l pressure is
to abandon him to himself and demora lize him."n This sociological perspective
on suicide converges neatly with Freud 's account of introjection and guilt. as well
as with the history of western drama. For all his crimes. Orestes is still very much
at one with the social world around him; but for all his acceptance of its values.
Willy Loman and man y of the othe r primary figures of modem drama are
fundamentally isolated from it.
One could perhaps simpli fy th is constru ct ion by sugg esting that
Aescbylean tragedy is about murder. whereas modem drama is about suicide. In
Aescbylean tragedy, the bero acts as a tool of the gods in order to avenge himse lf
upon those who have wronged him. This can lead to a cycle ofmurder and betrayal,
as avengers visit vengeance on other avengers. Modem psychological drama short-
circuits the process by centering everything in and around the individual himself.
Heacts in accordance with the dictates not of gods who reside outside himself but
oflhe stem taskmaster within. and the vengeance he carries out is frequently against
himself alone. Hence, when he dies, there is, it would seem, no need for him to be
avenged. And yet Willy Loman leaves his sons with a stem legacy and an ego
ideal that they can hardly succeed in living up to. Although Miller ' s play ends
with Linda Loman's observation that "we're free and clear" because Willy's debts
have now finally been paid off. that financial freedom by no means translates into
a moral or ethical freedom. Financial debt may be gone. but Willy's legacy of
guilt doubtless remains. And when Biff and Happy inevitably fail to be the princes
Willy had imagined them to be, Willy's physical absence from the house will not
guarantee his psychological absence from the conscience of his sons. Whereas the
criminal Orestes had confidently declared "My father will aid me from the grave."
Biff and the sadly named Happy will not be so lucky."
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This account also suggests an explanation ofthe radical provocation posed
by Bertolt Brecht to the development of modem drama. Although Brecht labeled
his theater non-Aristotelian, he was theoretically in agreement with Aristotle on
the relative lack of importance ofcharacter development and psychology. At least
theoretically, Brecht would have agreed with Aristotle that what is really important
is what characters do, not what they think or why they think it. Hence , Brecht's
plays are fundamentally about a social, not an individual world. Paradoxically,
Brecht's creation of the epic theater as a modem response to the crisis of drama in
the twentieth century returned at least in this way to the origin of tragedy itself,
even if, in many other ways, Brecht may represent elements ofAbel's self-reflexive
"metatheatre." Brecht's apparent opposite pole in modem theater, Samuel Beckett-
who drove the typical isolation, fragmentation, and alienation of the modern
individual to its logical extreme in his plays , at times replacing whole bodies with
mere body parts-in fact also tends to eliminate psychology and character
development from his theater, thus paradoxically restoring an almost Attic balance
between the riven individual on the one hand and a broken world on the other.
Both Brecht and Beckett would suggest that the most advanced practitioners of
modem and postmodem drama in the twentieth century sought to overcome the
bind into which modem psychological drama 's emphasis on character development
had driven them. Hence , one must make a distinction between the psychological
realism of modem drama in Ibsen and O'Neill, for instance, and the rejection of
psychological realism by modernists like Brecht, Beckett, and Artaud. It was
entirely appropriate for Steiner to include Brecht among his witnesses to the possible
continuation, or rebirth, of tragedy. 74 The radically anti-psychological thrust of
much advanced modem and postmodern drama does indeed point to a possible
convergence with ancient tragedy, even if avant-garde theater does not always
succeed in escaping psychology. However, in most ofthe western world, including
the United States, mainstream theater continues to be dominated by psychological
realism. This suggests that we live in a world characterized by a mainstream theater
in which tragedy is still dead and an avant-garde theater which is making serious
attempts to escape from psychological realism and, hence , to return to tragedy. If
Freud had written Civilization and its Discontents as a response to a dissatisfaction
with modem culture so great that it culminated in the belief "that we should be
much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions," then
contemporary avant-garde theater, precisely in its frequent embrace ofthe "primitive
conditions" that prevail in tragedy, is surely a prime example of dissatisfaction
with modem culture. However, it should be remembered that, for Freud, the progress
of civilization, for all its problems, was nevertheless positive; even hypertrophic
guilt was preferable to a state ofutter lawlessness. If the tendency ofavant-garde
theater to discard psychology goes beyond mere "discontent" and represents an
actual desire to return "to primitive conditions ," then Freud would no doubt have
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disapproved of it. In this sense, Freud and Ibsen are simi lar: they both know the
problems and pain ofcontempo rary ex istence, and ofcontemporary psychology,
but neither of them has a better alte rnati ve. Far from joining Wagner, Nietzsche,
and Krutch in mourning the death of tra gedy, Freud would have welcomed it as a
sign of difficult but. nevertheless. praiseworthy progress.
My account of the fundamental dis tinction between archaic tragedy and
modem psychological drama as lying in the gradual development of a guilty
conscience exemplified particularly in the phenomen on of suicide draws eclectically
from Aristotle, Nietzsche, Durkhe im, Freud. Krutch, Stei ner, and Abe l. The central
insight into the role played by guilt in modem civilization comes from Freud.
However, this insight is not necessarily dependent on the co mplete historical
accuracy of Freud 's lurid account of the totem meal and the anthropological origins
of the Oedipus complex . Certainly the references to cannibalism in the Oresteia
and elsewhere in ancient Greek tradition suggest that Freud 's explanation may not
be completely impossible. Moreover, Storm's recent em phasis on sparagmos-
dismembe rment-and omophagia- the consumptio n ofraw flesh- as lying at the
origin of tragic drama concurs entirely with Freud's account. Although Storm
stresses the tendency of sparagmos to occ ur metaphorically in modem drama, he
focuses on its phys ical occurrence at the origin of tragedy.'» However, it is
impossible to know for sure; and at any rate, the actual o rigin ofhurna n feel ings of
guilt may not beas important as the fundamental fact of their existence . All tha t is
necessary for the account of the death of tragedy is a recognition of the central role
of guilt itselfin the development of culture. no matter how tha t guilt may originally
have come about. My account ofmodem drama as centering on the psycho logical
dismemberment of the protagon ist doveta ils with Storm's theory of tragedy ;
however, unlike Sto rm, who sees more continuity than d iscontin uity, I make a
clear break between Aeschylean tragedy and the later de velopment of dram a,
particularly modem psychological drama. It mak es a differen ce if a drama is about
an outer world tha t, how ever tom or conflicting, is in fundamental agreeme nt with
an inner world, or if, instead. a drama is about an inner world that cannot bebrought
into agreement with an o uter world . A drama that focu ses on the impossi bility of
individual happi ness is very different from a drama that foc uses on the cosmic ri fts
in the world at large. Analysis ofAeschy lean drama and ofArthu r Miller's Death
of a Salesman would suggest that there are inde ed , empirically, funda mental
differences between Attic tragedy and mode m psychological drama and that one
of the prim~ry differences lies in character de ve lopm ent o r lack thereof and,
particular ly, in the conscious ness ofguilt. Soc iologically, Durkheim 's account of
modem societies as leading to the phenomena of soc ial anom ie, rootlessness. and
disturbi ngly high rat es of suic ide correspo nds to Freud 's ow n account of the
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frequently intolerable burden of guilt in modem culture. Both suggest a theoretical
explanation for the empirical findings in the analysis of Aeschylean and modem
drama.
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